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Abstract
This article focuses on the roots and mechanisms of Macron’s success, arguing that in 2017 two conditions were essential
in Macron’s rise—the implosion of the established system of the French Fifth Republic in which the two main parties were
alternating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment populist challengers on the right and on the left (cf. Stockemer,
2017; Zulianello, 2020). It was anti-establishment appeal that put Macron on the map, but the appeal to technocratic
competence that won him the presidency. Technocratic populism transcends the left–right cleavage and, as a result, has a
broader appeal than its left- and right-wing counterparts. Emmanuel Macron was an insider taking on the (crumbling) sys-
tem and positioning himself as an outsider—refusing the traditional labels, including centrism, elite recruitment patterns,
and mediated politics. Instead, Macron and La Republique enMarche attempted to create new forms of responsiveness by
‘giving voice to the people,’ while relying on technocratic competence as a legitimation mechanism. In power Emmanuel
Macron attempts to balance responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Guasti & Buštíková, 2020).
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1. Introduction
Commentators consider the French presidential election
in May 2017 as a disruption (Perrineau, 2017) in the long
tradition of French politics. The dramatic changes include
failure of the mainstream candidates on the right and
the left in the first round of the presidential elections,
the use of social media, and a relatively high abstention
rate. The most significant change was the winner of the
election himself: Emmanuel Macron, a young newcom-
er. Macron was elected at the age of 39, the youngest
elected President of the Fifth republic before him was
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, elected at the age of 48. This
youth was also a part of the newness and freshness.
Before the Presidency, Emmanuel Macron never held an
elected office. Even though he was Minister of Economy,
Industry, and Digital Affairs in Manuel Valls’ government
(2014–2016), Macron successfully presented himself as
an outsider. Macron cultivated the image of a (moder-
ate) challenger of the old system, the only one able to
transcend the stale establishment of French politics and
reform France, the only candidate to overcome the old
sterile French cleavages.
This election seemed to fulfil the idea of a success-
ful third way, neither right nor left, breaking the tra-
ditional cleavage typical for the last seven decades of
French politics. Emmanuel Macron won both the first
and the second round of the presidential elections, even
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though it was his first election. This victory of a newcom-
er was confirmed by the general election results a month
later. Macron’s new ‘party’ La Republique en Marche
(The Republic on the Move, LREM), gained an absolute
majority. It enabled Macron to form a Government able
to enact Macron’s ambitious plan to transform French
politics and society. Like their leader, the majority of
the new parliamentarians were newcomers and had nev-
er held elected office before (LREM lost a part of its
deputies quite rapidly, and in the spring of 2020, it lost its
absolute majority; Momtaz, 2020). This was seen as evi-
dence of the promise of the renewal of French politics
(Surel, 2019).
As in other cases of successful personalist populist
parties founded by outsiders and disrupting difunction-
al party systems (Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in 1994 and
Babiš’s ANO in 2013), Emmanuel Macron’s rapid ‘march
to the power’ started officially almost a year before,
without clear electoral support, with a relatively weak
program and blurred campaign funding (Kuhn, 2017).
Berlusconi and Babiš both combined populist and tech-
nocratic appeal to broaden their electoral chances. Both
have been studied through the lens of technocratic pop-
ulism, used initially to study Latin America (Buštíková &
Guasti, 2019; Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; de la Torre,
2013; Havlík, 2019). As Emmanuel Macron shares many
of their characteristics, this article applies the techno-
cratic populism perspective to test whether Macron is a
technocratic populist.
This article proceeds as follows. In part two, we
clarify some of the terminology and concepts (focus-
ing on technocratic populism) used to show how and
why Emmanuel Macron (as a leader) matches these
categories (as a charismatic leader claiming technocrat-
ic competence, against the established political elites).
In part three and four we explain how and why Macron’s
success was possible and to what extent he is a techno-
cratic populist in power, mainly by focusing on the ways
he governs.
2. Varieties of Populism and the Technocratic Populism
The debate on the conceptual definition of populism and
the terminology is still open (for instance, see Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).
Some of the commonly used criteria to define pop-
ulism are ‘thin ideology’, people vs. elites, specific politi-
cal rhetoric and style, or strategy. Populism varies across
time and space and has many faces beyond the classi-
cal (extreme) right-wing (Norris, 2020; Zulianello, 2020).
In order to classify whether and what type of populist
Emmanuel Macron is, we draw on classical scholars of
populism (Canovan, 1999; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2018), a contemporary contribution (Buštíková & Guasti,
2019), and theoretical scholarship on similarities and
differences between populist and technocratic critiques
of party democracy (cf. Bickerton & Accetti, 2017;
Caramani, 2017).
Using the literature on varieties of populism (Caiani &
Graziano, 2016; Zulianello, 2020) and the case of France,
we show the vast differences among various populisms
present on the French political scene and the long and
rich history of populism in France—for instance, the
boulangism (1885–1889) or the poujadism in the 1950s
(Birnbaum, 2012; Surel, 2019). We can identify Marine
Le Pen and her National Rally (ex-National Front; Mudde
& Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon and
his France Unbowed (La France Insoumise; Ivaldi, 2019;
Norris, 2020; Rosanvallon, 2020; Surel, 2019) as pop-
ulist (Zulianello, 2020). Both represent different pop-
ulism types, as the host ideology diverges—the National
Front is a radical right-wing populist party and France
Unbowed, on the contrary, is a radical left-wing pop-
ulist party. The disparities in terms of leadership, style,
rhetoric, and above all in terms of programs are quite sig-
nificant. However, they share some similarities (like the
positioning against the EU; cf. Halikiopoulou, Nanou, &
Vasilopoulou, 2012).
At first sight, Emmanuel Macron has nothing in
common with Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
The Chapel Hill Survey (2019) shows that Macron’s
LREM is quite far away from the positions of both
right-wing and left-wing populist parties, especially on
the EU (LREM is broadly pro-European), protectionism,
and other policies. Most importantly, compared to the
National Front and France Unbowed, Macron’s LREM
also scores relatively low on anti-elite salience. However,
while Emmanuel Macron and his LREM position them-
selves as the representatives of a moderate part of the
French political arena, LREM scores higher on anti-elite
salience than other moderate French parties. According
to CHES experts, LREM is a moderate, non-populist
party. However, for Norris and Inglehart (2017, p. 12),
Emmanuel Macron is a centrist populist leader. As Pippa
Norris mentioned:
Despite often being labelled ‘radical right,’ in fact, pop-
ulist parties are also distributed in the other quad-
rants….There are also a few populist parties scattered
in the other quadrants, such as President Macron
who campaigned for La République En Marche! as an
anti-establishment outsider, while advocating moder-
ate economic policies and a pro-EU stance. (Norris,
2020, p. 15)
The core of Macron’s populist appeal relies on the cri-
tique and rejection of intermediate bodies, combined
with a robust anti-establishment discourse and a spe-
cific call to the French people. Macron has already
been classified as a populist by political scientists (Ivaldi,
2019), sometimes in a specific way (“populist from the
extreme-centre,’’ Godin, 2016; “antipopulist populist,”
Bordignon, 2017). To some extent, the rise of Emmanuel
Macron should be seen as an effect of the Fifth Republic
system, but in a new populist logic dominating the
French political landscape.
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The adaptability of populism to various ideologies is
not new (Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). One of our prima-
ry hypotheses is that populism, mainly as a discourse and
a style, is not limited to the political extremes on the left
and the right and should not be reduced to a democratic
threat (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018; Stavrakakis & Jäger,
2018). The concept of centrist populism has been used
to describe parties neither on the left nor on the right.
It is based on an assumption of an ideal political space,
an in-between, rejecting the ideological extremes.
Mattia Zulianello (2020) has significantly contribut-
ed to conceptualizing this residual category into a new
type. Valence populist parties compete predominantly,
if not exclusively, by focusing on nonpositional ‘valence’
issues, such as the fight against corruption, increased
transparency, democratic reform, and moral integrity,
while emphasizing anti-establishment motives. There is
no ideological positioning on the difference between
the mentioned centrist populist and the claim of com-
petence and performance (Zulianello, 2020). Historically,
valence populist parties emerged mainly in Central
and Eastern Europe (Haughton & Deegan-Krause, 2015;
Učeň, 2007).
We argue that the concept of valence populism
(Zulianello, 2020, p. 329) is a good starting point to cap-
ture Emmanuel Macron and his LREM for two reasons.
First, Emmanuel Macron rejected being positioned in
the center—for him, the left, the right, and the cen-
ter are obsolete categories. Second, using the flexibili-
ty of valence populism enables us to identify Macron’s
key valence issue—technocratic expertise. Emmanuel
Macron presents himself as an expert in both the pub-
lic and private spheres. The concept of valence pop-
ulism captures both Macron’s refusal to be positioned
on the left–right continuum and his self-presentation—
founding his legitimacy in his career in the state appara-
tus and the banking sector.
Focusing on Macron’s self-identification as an expert
and his career as a technocrat also resonates with
the concept of technocratic populism. Technocratic pop-
ulism as a ‘thin ideology’ is based on the rejection of the
traditional political parties and on the promise of apo-
litical expert solutions that benefit the ‘ordinary people’
(Buštíková & Guasti, 2019) As showed by Buštíková and
Guasti, “it combines the ideology of expertise with a pop-
ulist political appeal to ordinary people,” “technocratic
populism uses the ideology of numbers and the ideol-
ogy of expert knowledge to appeal directly to the vot-
ers using an anti-elite, populist rhetoric” (Buštíková &
Guasti, 2019, p. 305). Interestingly the technocratic pop-
ulism undermines the principle of horizontal and verti-
cal accountability, as Caramani showed (Caramani, 2017;
Guasti, 2020).
Two key features of Macron’s appeal match this
conceptualization. His strong rhetoric against his for-
mer Socialist party and broadly against all the French
political elites—an anti-establishment strategy. Second,
the use of personal competence as a form of legiti-
mation and a strategy to distinguish himself from his
anti-establishment competitors, especially his main com-
petitor in the second round of presidential elections,
Marine Le Pen.
Nevertheless, let us summarize some criteria of
the technocratic populism: A charismatic leader calls
for the fight against the political establishment in the
name of the people, denouncing the intermediate bod-
ies (in a broad sense, including parties), and communicat-
ing directly with the people. Technocratic populism does
not only appear as an alternative to the ideology of lib-
eral democratic pluralism (Havlík, 2019) but also when
the traditional party system is exhausted, and stale main-
stream parties are unable to effectively react to new chal-
lenges (cf. Caiani & Graziano, 2016). Under these con-
ditions, a weakened party system creates an opening
for newcomers (cf. Aprasidze & Siroky, 2020; Buštíková
& Guasti, 2019; Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; Ganuza &
Font, 2020).
3. The Origins of Macron’s Technocratic Populism
3.1. The Social and Political Frame of Macron’s
Technocratic Populism
In explaining the rise of populism to power, it is essen-
tial to consider the appeal and strategies of ascending
populists and the political context. To some extent, they
are the product of their time and, above all of the society
from which they arise and which allows them to win elec-
tions (on the long-term changes in politics and society in
Western Europe, see Lynch, 2019; on populism and cri-
sis, see Caiani & Graziano, 2016). The rise of Emmanuel
Macron is both the result of his charisma, political acu-
men and successful strategy, but also of the state of
French politics.
The initial roots ofMacron’s success seem tobe in the
economic and financial crisis in the late 2000s when the
French government’s attempt to find a solution seemed
ineffective. Nevertheless, we have to look at its deep-
er roots in French history. The main change we have to
point out is the progressive disappearance of the clear
left–right cleavage. This cleavage is linked to the begin-
ning of the French Revolution after 1789 and the con-
frontation of ‘two Frances.’ In the second half of the
20th century, we can see that for the first time, this
cleavage was suppressed by the rise of the French Fifth
Republic under the leadership of Charles De Gaulle and
the beginning of 23 years of ‘dextrism’ (the government
of the right).
The French Fifth Republic was confrontational. While
the right was in power, the left alternative was clear
and sharp (but also divided between the declining
Communist party and the growing Socialist party).
The shift from right to left occurred in 1981 after the suc-
cess of Francois Mitterrand in the presidential election.
It was seen as a revolutionary or a catastrophic moment
(depending on the analyst).
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After some years, the leftist policy showed its limits,
and Mitterrand decided to turn in 1983–1984. The gov-
ernment began to take a much more liberal line. This his-
torical change (practically the abandonment of a long-
term program of the French left) was not successful.
After the 1986 general elections, France experienced, for
the first time, the cohabitation of the left and the right,
and the reverse policy of privatizations.
The ideological rapprochement of the left and its
embrace of the liberal paradigm blurred the tradi-
tional differences between the left and the right—
both were practically calling for the same solutions
and became indistinguishable, especially on economic
issues. What remained was a vast difference between
the moderate right and the moderate left regarding
social positioning (identity issues). The economic and
financial crisis brought the political compromise about
the liberal paradigm to the fore and engendered the
anti-establishment critique of Jean-Marie Le Pen, who
denounced both the left and the right as ‘bonnet blanc et
blanc bonnet’ or, in other words, the plot of the collusion
of political elites that were seemingly in opposition.
In the years leading to the 2017 presidential elec-
tions, the moderate right lost an essential part of its
electorate to the radical right. Yet, its electoral failure
is a result of the scandals of the Republican candidate
François Fillon. Macron presented himself as the only
real alternative to the old, and delegitimated the polit-
ical establishment from both sides, moderate right and
left. The key to Macron’s rise was the breakdown of the
Socialist party, which made the shift of the left-wing
electorate to LREM possible. This new situation appears
clearly if we compare, for instance, the results of the
Socialist’s candidates in the first round of the presiden-
tial elections in 2012 and 2017 (Hollande 28.63% and
Hamon 6.36%, respectively). We can make here a par-
allel with the situation in the Czech Republic, where
the technocratic populist A. Babiš won a large part of
the left-wing electorate in 2013 and 2017 (Buštíková &
Guasti, 2019; Stauber, 2019) or to the rise of Igor Matovič
in Slovakia (Buštíková & Babos, 2020).
Due to the failure of the mainstream parties on the
left and the right, Emmanuel Macron was seen as the
sole candidate likely to defeat Marine Le Pen in the
2017 presidential elections. He was also seen as the rep-
resentative of young modern France—a leader propos-
ing a genuinely modern vision and reforms necessary
to save France from its long-term social and econom-
ic difficulties.
3.2. A Specific Career of a Technocrat
Emmanuel Macron is a classical product of the French
technocracy that appears after the Second World War.
The reform of the state was driven by the idea of a pro-
fessional depoliticized administration. The new model,
which persists today, has at its top the National School of
Administration (Ecole Nationale d’Administration, ENA).
ENA still forms the elite of the French civil servants.
Macron (who studied at Sciences Po Paris before ENA)
ranked fifth in his group at the end of the cursus, thus
demonstrating an extraordinary competence.
For a long time, ENA has been criticized as a form
of elite reproduction. The first systematic critic of this
school and the elites it produced appeared in the late
1960s (Mandrin, 1967). Very little has changed since, and
the critique can be considered just as relevant today. ENA
is an elitist and technocratic school. It produced genera-
tions of high civil servants, who made a career not only
in the French high administration but also in politics and
the private sector.
Emmanuel Macron is a typical product of ENA. After
ENA, Macron had a short career in the Inspectorate
General of Finances and then moved to a multina-
tional investment bank and financial services company
Rothschild & Co. Some of the first information about
Macron to appear in the French media, in Summer 2014,
emphasized his “impressive curriculum vitae” (Chabas,
2014). We can recall here the words of Paul Taggart:
Populism “requires the most extraordinary individuals to
lead the most ordinary of people” (Taggart, 2000, p. 1;
see also Mudde, 2004).
Macron turned against this form of elite reproduc-
tion, as a consequence of the 2019 debate. Macron—
part of an elite—turned against the elite and espoused
anti-elite discourse. In the aftermath of the November
2015 terrorist attacks, he said: “The elites, not the soci-
ety, bear a responsibility” (“Radicalisation: Macron juge
les élites,” 2015). Emmanuel Macron was a high techno-
crat with experience in both the public and the private
sectors. In 2015 he turned populist, but his technocrat-
ic competences (and efficiency) remains the source of
his legitimacy. Macron was the right man at the right
place in the right time—technocratic populist at the crit-
ical juncture of French politics marked by the break-
down of left–right cleavage. The second round of the
2017 election was Emmanuel Macron or Marine Le Pen—
technocratic populist palatable for many, or radical right
leader, unacceptable for the voters of mainstream par-
ties (cf. Stockemer, 2017).
3.3. The Rise of a Charismatic Technocrat
From the beginning of his successful electoral cam-
paign, Emmanuel Macron presented himself as the
champion of the fight against the political system. He
introduced himself as an outsider—a new politician
who is not linked to the establishment and the old-
fashioned parties and elites. He vowed to abandon out-
dated ideological discourses and practices and focus
on practical and effective solutions to contemporary
economic and societal problems. In a 2016 debate
with Columbia University students, Macron embraced
anti-establishment rhetoric and reiterated the refusal
to be placed on the LR continuum by his opponents
(Robequain, 2016). Macron saw himself as fighting the
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old and ineffective model of French political compe-
tition; as somebody who transcends the more than
200-year-old left–right cleavage.
During his brief career as a minister, Macron identi-
fied as a Socialist. But in 2016, he rejected this ‘label’
along with the ‘centrist’ label, preferring at that time
‘man of the left’ or ‘liberal’ (Macron, 2016). He also
started to cite a broad list of references (mixing Pierre
Mendès-France, François Mitterrand, but mainly Charles
de Gaulle). Nevertheless, his policies could certainly be
seen as centrist in the French context (Barlow, 2017).
His positioning between the oldest (formerly) domi-
nant parties (the Socialist party on the left and the
Republicans on the right) is seen in France as evidence
of this. To some extent, Macron and the LREM sym-
bolically pushed the old-fashioned ‘centrists’ from the
Mouvement Démocrate to the right.
The ability to attract media coverage is crucial
to understanding the speed of Macron’s political rise.
Emmanuel Macron succeeded in portraying an image of
a political outsider taking on the old dysfunctional estab-
lishment that did not match the reality—with his past
career within the system he criticized since the begin-
ning of his path to the French presidency. The changes
in French society, namely its de-ideologization and
de-politicization (Perottino, 2016), contributed to the
appeal of an apolitical technocracy (cf. Putnam, 1977).
Macron’s 2016 arrival on the political scene as a
presidential candidate is simultaneous with the pro-
found crises of the French establishment political par-
ties on the left (Socialists) and on the right (Republicans).
In the second round of the 2017 elections, Emmanuel
Macron also presented his new movement (LREM)
as the only alternative to the extreme right pop-
ulist Marine Le Pen’s National Front (today National
Rally). The alternative to the exclusionary populism of
Marine Le Pen was Macron’s new formula mixing anti-
establishment populist discourse with an appeal to tech-
nocracy and expertise.
Sofia Ventura showed that, during his campaign,
Macron denounced the political elites and the gap
between the elite and the people: “They no longer speak
for the people, they speak for themselves” (Ventura,
2018, p. 95). In his book, Macron rejected at that time
the French political elite as a whole (Macron, 2016).
Finally, in November 2018, in front of the French may-
ors, Macron presented himself and LREM “as real pop-
ulists, we are with the people, every day” (Jublin, 2018).
By doing this, Macron draws a line between populism
and demagogues (i.e., Le Pen).
The populist appeal of a former Minister and tech-
nocrat remains counter intuitive. Nevertheless, Macron
was described as a populist (Bordignon, 2017; Godin,
2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and embraced the label
himself (Jublin, 2018; Macron, 2016). This article aims
to question both these premises and demonstrate the
extent to which Emmanuel Macron can be described as
a technocratic populist. To do that,we analyze the French
specificities and show how this new reality matches the
ideal type of technocratic populism.
3.4. Macron as the Only Possible Solution
As we already stated, one of the key factors of the
Macron’s success was (and still is) the failure of the
well-established parties of the moderate left and right
(cf. Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020, for parallel develop-
ment in Italy). These parties were alternating in power
since the 1970s, dominating French political life. Their
domination progressively eroded due to the growing
electoral success of the anti-establishment radical right
National Front, which challenged the political establish-
ment. However, the progressive weakening of the estab-
lishment parties was mainly due to internal causes (inca-
pacity to select competent elites or corruption; Perottino,
2016). As the establishment eroded, and the radical right
remained unpalatable for mainstream voters, a window
of opportunity opened for Macron, who successfully
used it.
Macron started his political career with the Socialist
Party (he was a ranking member of this party in
2006–2009; “Emmanuel Macron n’est plus encarté,”
2015). However, he rose in the ranks thanks to his profes-
sional technocratic career, competence, and networks
(social capital). His legitimacy claim was to be an out-
sider, even if he was one of the essential ministers
before running for President (Pietralunga & Bonnefous,
2016). This (relative) newness was also underlined by his
age and largely contradicted the ‘normal’ way to enter
politics in France. Once again, Macron was the insider-
outsider product and a part of a system he denounced:
“Faced with the system, my will to transgress is strong”
(“Emmanuel Macron: Face au système,” 2016).
Macron refused to play the game of the left and
declined participating in the presidential primaries de
facto organized by his former party. This refusal was
quite logical as Macron refused to be seen as a part
of an ending world and to risk losing his main advan-
tages without gaining anything. He was criticized for
his weak ideological anchoring, and a blur program.
Macron’s approach and action can be seen as return-
ing to what Maurice Duverger called the ‘swamp’
(le marais; see Elgie, 2018). As mentioned by Mayaffre,
Bouzereau, Ducoffe, Guaresi, and Precioso (2017, p. 135):
“Emmanuel Macron’s speeches cultivate dynamics more
than they work on themes; they rely on the modali-
ties of politics and action (bringing together, setting in
motion, building consensus) more than on the political
program itself.’’
Emmanuel Macron entered the political world as
a technocrat, not through the classical electoral path.
He never ran at any level of the French political system.
His legitimacy was only technocratic, as a high civil ser-
vant and as a top bank manager. Macron’s two years
engagement as a minister gave him a high capacity to
show his know-how and provided necessary credibility
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as a social-liberal. His private sector career equipped
him to present himself as more transparent and effi-
cient than his fellow ministers in the Socialist govern-
ment. While the government was facing strong critiques,
part of the opposition presented Macron as a ‘good
minister doing good things.’ During his time as a minis-
ter of economy, Macron’s signature legislation was the
Law for growth, activity and equal economic opportu-
nities (French Republic, 2015), known as Macron Law
(broad law composed of measures concerning a large
part of the economic activity, changing numerous rules,
for instance, the work at night or on Sunday, the taxes
or liberalizing coach transport). Macron’s capacity to har-
ness support for the law among both left and right was
evident, foreshadowing his capacity to establish LREM as
a movement logically bridging or transcending the left
and the right.
Hand in hand with the changes that occurred in the
French society during the last three or four decades,
Emmanuel Macron as a minister and as a presidential
candidate practically embodied the modern spirit, dom-
inated by the (neo)liberal discourse. In other words, he
appeared the contrary of the old elite: Young, modern,
uncorrupted, competent, and fulfilling the ideal of the
technocrat from both public and private sectors. During
a 2017 TV debate with Marine Le Pen, Macron’s com-
petence, knowledge, and effectiveness were evident,
and he successfully outperformed Le Pen, demonstrating
his qualities.
4. Technocratic Populist in Power
Macron’s undeniable personal competence, culture,
and charm made him a charismatic presidential can-
didate. On 7 May 2017, the 39-year old disrupter
became the youngest President in the history of France.
In his inaugural speech, Macron combined an appeal
to the people, with the promise of competence and
renewal—highlighting the redemptive politics of pop-
ulism (Canovan, 1999):
My dear fellow citizens, a new page in our history
has been turned this evening. I want it to be that of
renewed hope and confidence. The renewal of our
public life will be a requirement for everyone as from
tomorrow. Raising moral standards in our public life,
recognizing pluralism, and democratic vitality will be
the bedrock of my action from the first day. I will not
let any obstacle get in my way. I will work with deter-
mination and with due respect for everyone, because
through work, school and culture, we will build a bet-
ter future. (Macron, 2017b)
For Macron, the sui generis candidate, the election
was a turning point, as he faces the choice between
three archetypal presidential postures. First, the ‘par-
tisan President’—ideological, engaged in everyday pol-
itics and deeply unpopular (Hollande). Second, ‘perfor-
mative president’—highly active and visible known as
the ‘hyperpresident’ (Sarkozy). And third, a ‘Jupiterian
president’—detached from everyday politics above ‘the
political scrum’ and beloved by the people (de Gaulle).
Macron, a long-time admirer of de Gaulle, embraces
the latter symbolically and in his presidential posture—
his official presidential photograph prominently fea-
tures de Gaulle’s war memoirs opened on President’s
desk (Boudet, 2017). As a President, Macron communi-
cates less, leaves everyday politics to the government,
while engaging on the global scene. This detached style
enables Macron to maintain support and deflect critique
for unpopular aspects of reforms (“Macron ne croit pas,”
2016; see also Cole, 2018). It also enables him to distin-
guish himself from the highly political presidents of the
Third and the Fourth Republic (Cole, 2018). Macron large-
ly maintained this de Gaule-inspired hands-off style until
the Covid-19 pandemic when he became more involved
(Pietralunga, Zappi, & de Royer, 2020).
4.1. Responsiveness: The Leader Giving Voice to
the People
The vehicle for Macron’s rise was his movement LREM.
Multiple versions of the party’s name existed over time,
the initial En Marche!, with an emphasis on the EM
acronym, evolved into today’s LREM. LREM, a broad
movement, enabled Macron to form a base and societal
support “the raison d’être of LREM is to gather goodwill
(and support) around a positive ambition for our coun-
try” (En Marche, 2020). The LREM founding myth is that
it was formed from the bottom-up, from the “desire to
rebuild from below” (En Marche, 2020). However, LREM
is a top-down movement—part communication strate-
gy, part political organizing—but Emmanuel Macron, his
advisors and staff, ‘give people the voice’ (En Marche,
2020). It is Macron who enables the people to express
their will through the unmediated relationship with him
(cf. Caramani, 2017). At the core of LREM is technocrat-
ic populism. Macron outlined his agenda before the first
round of French presidential elections in 2017: “A France
which goes beyond the old divisions to put in place
the solutions that work, and which finally leads to a
real moralization of its political life” (Macron, 2017a).
Technocratic populism best captures this mixture of pop-
ulist and technocratic appeals.
En Marche started in May 2016 with a large door to
door campaign. In the ‘Great Walk,’ 4,000 volunteers sur-
veying 100,000 citizens, providing the basis for LREM’s
program. The aim of the ‘Great Walk’ was to project
responsiveness and competence—LREM surveyed the
will of the people and processed this will into a ‘uni-
fied interest of the country.’ In reality, this was an effec-
tive campaign using techniques and staff with experi-
ence working on the campaigns of Francois Hollande
and Barrack Obama. The survey was processed and ana-
lyzed by 200 experts and spin doctors (Dryef, 2017;
Strudel, 2017).
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The main innovation (compared to campaigns run by
political parties), was ‘giving voice to the ordinary peo-
ple’ to draft the party program. LREM drew historical par-
allels to the letters of grievances (Cahiers de doléances,
drawn up in 1789), but using experts’ competence to
aggregate the answers into a coherent electoral program.
The collection of people’s grievances was a way to create
a direct linkage between the people (everybody can par-
ticipate) and the leader, eliminating intermediate bodies
(including political parties’ role as ‘transmission belts’;
cf. Sartori, 1976).
Facing the Yellow Vests protest in 2018, Emmanuel
Macron scaled the 2016 ‘Great Walk’ to the national
level. In December 2018, the Great National Debate,
a ‘listening tour’ comprised of more than 10,000 local
meetings, generated more than two million proposals on
four topics: energy transition, economy (including taxa-
tion, retirement age, pensions), democracy, and citizen-
ship (including immigration, ‘political Islam,’ and reform
of state and public services—including the role of elite
schools such as ENA; “Key points of Macron’s plans,”
2019). Emmanuel Macron, whose popularity decreased
significantly between 2017 and 2018, participated per-
sonally in dozens of these sessions, promising to dedi-
cate the second part of his mandate to “putting citizens
at the center of his agenda.” The debates coincided with
the beginning of the electoral campaign for the European
parliament elections, and Macron’s critics viewed it as
a political strategy to improve the President’s image—
highlighting the exaggeration of the number of partici-
pants, as well as the fact that the government is still to
take up the proposals.
As a follow up to the 2018 Great National Debate,
a Citizen Assembly was organized between 2019 and
2020. In October 2019, 150 randomly selected citizens
participated in debates focused on climate change. The
debates were broad and democratic, producing a large
set of proposals. However, similarly to the Great National
Debate, reservations prevail about the future of the
proposals—in contrast to the initial announcement, the
President decided to dismiss some of the proposals.
Furthermore, the drawmethod for randomselectionwas
unclear (the Harris Interactive polling institute selected
the 150 citizens), and the Parliament was excluded from
the process.
All three procedures for engaging citizens—the
‘Great Walk,’ the ‘Great National Debate,’ and the
‘Citizens Assembly’ represent new forms of direct link-
age between the people and the reader. They bypass
traditional representative institutions and do not offer
any form of clear accountability. Unlike the institution of
referenda, which has previously destabilized presidents’
positions (1969 and 2005), these new democratic inno-
vations combine the appeal of responsiveness, without
accountability (Macron has full control over the imple-
mentation of outcomes). The debates ‘give voice to the
people’ as the President ‘listens,’ politics is unmediated
and personalized, and the leader remains unconstrained
and has experts on his side to help him decipher the will
of the people (cf. Caramani, 2017).
4.2. Responsibility: The Reforms and the Limits of
Technocratic Populism in Power
Historically, French pension reforms trigger backlash—
popular mobilization and strikes—and can lead to the
fall of government (1995 pension reform). In fall 2019,
Macron’s government initiated major pension reform.
In contrast to 1995, Macron’s government has a more
efficient communication strategy—combining populist
and technocratic appeals of ‘us vs. them’—the clash of
the old and the new systems, experts vs. ideologues,
the necessity of reform vs. the irresponsible status quo.
Unlike in 1995, the contemporary opposition was unable
to formulate an understandable critique, trade unions
were weakened, and the society was depoliticized.
Like in 1995, the 2019 reforms led to large-scale
protests. While the reaction to the 2018 Yellow Vest
protests was populist responsiveness, the reaction to
the 2019 protests marked the return of technocratic
populism. Emmanuel Macron portrayed himself and his
government as the representatives of modernity, pro-
moters of expert solutions, and the legitimate voice of
the people. He denounced the protesters as illegitimate,
imprudent, promoting illegitimate social gains for few
(protesters, strikers, trade unions) at the expense of the
many. In the case of the Yellow Vests, instances of vio-
lence during some demonstrations were instrumental-
ized to delegitimize the movement and its grievances.
The pension reform protest was delegitimized on the
grounds of lacking the competence to understand com-
plex issues.
Similarly to the pension reform, the Covid-19 cri-
sis also follows the technocratic populist playbook
(cf. Buštíková & Babos, 2020; Guasti, 2020). During
the pandemic’s initial phase, the President was most-
ly absent, and the government in charge. As the cri-
tique of the government intensified, Macron changed
his approach and took the lead. The President became
personally engaged, not in drafting and implementing
solutions; instead, Emmanuel Macron set out to search
for the best solution. This included a personal visit to
the proponent of hydroxychloroquine and media dar-
ling, Professor Raoult in Marseille, to personally dis-
cuss the potential of hydroxychloroquine as a cure.
Professor Raoult was at odds with the other experts, but
the President presented himself as ‘open-minded’ and
searching for effective solutions.
The reaction to the 2019 protests show the compli-
cated relationship between technocratic populism and
the will of the people—when people reject his politics,
Macron delegitimizes their voices because they are out-
side of the unified will of the people he embodies and
because their knowledge is inferior to the expertise of
the President and his advisors.
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5. Conclusion
In 2017 Emmanuel Macron transformed French Politics.
He emerged when the embattled traditional party sys-
tem imploded, and populism rose (radical left and radical
right). This article argues that Emmanuel Macron’s pres-
idential bid succeeded because he combined populist
anti-establishment appeal with a technocratic appeal to
competence. He was able to transcend the exhausted
politics of the left and the right, while simultaneously
fending off radical populist competitors (especially the
National Front) using technocratic populism.
Emmanuel Macron was an insider taking on the sys-
tem and positioning himself as an outsider. He refused
the traditional labels, including centrism, elite recruit-
ment patterns, and mediated politics. Instead, Macron
and LREM attempted to create new forms of respon-
siveness by ‘giving voice to the people,’ while relying on
his technocratic competence and that of his expert advi-
sors. Macron success highlights the exhaustion of the
left–right cleavage and the appeal of the new politics.
Technocratic populism in power attempts to bal-
ance responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Guasti &
Buštíková, 2020). In terms of responsiveness, Macron ini-
tiated new procedures for engaging citizens, forming a
new direct linkage between the leader and the people.
These procedures create an alternative to the tradition-
al representative institutions, unmediated politics with-
out accountability. The unified conception of the will of
the people combined with the belief in experts’ supe-
rior knowledge does not allow for dissent. Opposition
(such as the 2019) protests are delegitimized as uncivi-
lized and/or uninformed.
After reaching power, Emmanuel Macron sought to
distance himself from everyday politics. The Covid-19
crises forced him to reengage. In power, Macron is no
longer an outsider ‘taking on the system.’ Nevertheless,
he continues to use the same anti-establishment and
(selectively) anti-elitist discursive strategy of bringing the
‘people’ back. Some aspects of Macron’s technocratic
populism remain salient—competency (partly showed
during the Covid-19 crisis), the necessity to reform
France (the Covid-19 crisis has simultaneously delayed
reforms, but made them more salient), the denounce-
ment of the intermediate bodies, or the rejection of the
old elites (against their comeback to power). The power
of Macron’s technocratic populism has weakened, but it
remains an effective strategy against his mainstream and
populist competitors.
The contribution of this article to the study of pop-
ulism is threefold. First, it provides a systematic analy-
sis of Macron’s rise. Second, it highlights an important
condition for the rise of populism—the implosion of
the established party systems (cf. Caiani & Graziano,
2016; Castaldo & Verzichelli, 2020; Ganuza & Font, 2020;
Guasti & Buštíková, 2020). Third, it illustrates that pop-
ulist rhetoric is not limited to the extremes on the right
or the left (Norris, 2020).
Emmanuel Macron was undoubtedly a formidable
candidate. Both charismatic and credibly competent,
he stood in stark contrast to both the established par-
ties and their populist challengers. Macron combined
the redemptive promise of populism—to rejuvenate the
country with the technocratic promise of competent gov-
ernance (cf. Canovan, 1999). LREM also sought to build
a new, direct link with the people by introducing demo-
cratic innovations as a way to map people’s grievances.
Two conditions were essential in Macron’s rise:
The implosion of the established system of the French
Fifth Republic in which the two main parties were alter-
nating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment
populist challengers on the right and on the left
(cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). In was his anti-
establishment appeal, which put Macron on the map,
but the appeal to technocratic competence won him the
presidency. Technocratic populism transcends the left–
right cleavage and, as a result, has a broader appeal than
its left- and right-wing counterparts.
Finally, the rise of Emmanuel Macron and LREM
demonstrates that populism does not necessarily imply
a threat for liberal democracy and cannot be auto-
matically linked to illiberalism (cf. Norris & Inglehart,
2019). Populist rhetoric and thin-centered ideology can
be found in other ‘quadrants’ than on the extreme right
and extreme left (Norris, 2020). New forms of populism
include valence (cf. Zulianello, 2020) and technocratic
populism (cf. Buštíková & Guasti, 2019).
Future research should focus on the analysis of
the LREM. Beyond its leader’s technocratic populism, it
would be essential to analyze this new’ party’s institution-
alization and programmatic orientation. Furthermore,
comparatively, LREM could be analyzed in the context
of similar party-movements such us the Italian Five Star
Movement, Spanish Podemos, Czech ANO, and Slovak
Party of the Ordinary People. The recent dissent of
a large part of LREM’s MPs, decline in support for
Emmanuel Macron, and LREM MPs’ defections hint at
the degree of volatility these disrupters of the estab-
lished political order face. The Covid-19 response and
subsequent elections will test the competence and last-
ing appeal of technocratic populists.
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